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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Although
Defendant

Plaintiff's

Hospital

Complaint

has breached

clearly

alleges

both express and

that

implied

provisions of the written contracts executed by Plaintiff and
Said Defendant, the lower Court erred in failing entirely to
deal with allegations relative to the express provisions; and
Defendant

in their respective briefs have further sought to

perpetuate that error.

Also, Plaintiff's allegations regarding

a continued course of dealing between the parties reinforces the
Plaintiff's position and

requires a reversal of the lower

Court's dismissal of the First Two Cause$ of Action with
prejudice without leave to amend or plead over.
Nor should plaintiff be required to proceed with its Third
Course of Action while this appeal is pending on the other two
Causes of Action since the facts are interrelated and should be
presented to the trier of fact together and not as bifurcated
issues.
Neither the statute of frauds nor any riile of integration
such as the parol evidence rule is a proper bar to the implied
covenant which justice and equity require be recognized in the
circumstances here presented.
An implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies
to leases of real property as well as to all other contracts,
and

is an

important

factor

in this case

correctness of Plaintiff's position.

-1-

reinforcing

the

ARGUMENT

Plaintiff

St. Benedict's Development

Company

("Development

Company") responds to the briefs of Defendants St. Benedict's
Hospital

("Hospital") and The Boyer

Company

("Boyer") as

follows.
I.
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION
DO STATE CLAIMS UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED.
A.

Defendants Continue to Ignore the Express Contractual
Promises of Defendant Hospital to Plaintiff
Development Company.

The briefs of Defendants on appeal continue the pattern
Defendants have pursued throughout this litigation, of ignoring
Hospital's express contractual duty to help "obtain and retain
satisfactory professional tenants in the new office building,"
(Complaint, 11 18) and to "actively assist the partnership in
acquiring

good

tenants until such time as the New Office

Building is completely occupied."

(Complaint, 11 19.)

Contrary

to the assertion of Defendant Boyer at page 18 of its brief that
the Complaint does not allege that the Hospital breached these
duties, paragraph 32 of the Complaint describes the vacancies
which remain to be filled.

Because the second building which

Plaintiff Development Company constructed for Hospital has never
yet been completely occupied, it is plain that any activity by
or assisting
buildings
obligation.

the Hospital to lure tenants from Plaintiff's

is in breach of the Hospital's

express

written

Pretending it is otherwise, does not make it so.
-2-

By ignoring this express contractual breach, Defendants
attempt to create the impression that there is a great chasm
between the Hospital's duty to cooperate irl helping to keep
Plaintiff's

buildings filled and Defendants' position that

Defendant Hospital ought to be free to use its unleased property
for any purpose it sees fit.

However, the bridge that links the

Hospital's duty to Plaintiff to the manner in which the Hospital
uses its unleased land is not so gossamer as Defendants would
have it appear.

The issue is whether Hospital has the unbridled

right to break its promise to Plaintiff by depleting, rather
than augmenting, Plaintiff's stock of tenahts, not what the
Hospital might in theory be able to do with tither land it owns
in the absence of any contractual obligation tp Plaintiff.
Where

use

of

that

other

land

has

the

inevitable

consequence of interfering with Plaintiff's contractual rights,
that binding link cannot be ignored.

Given the circumstances

created by the contractual dealings of Plaintiff and Defendant
Hospital, namely

the construction of two adjoining

office

buildings, uniquely and exclusively suited to the sole function
of providing office space for physicians with privileges at
Defendant Hospital, Hospital should not be allowed to suck the
only

source of

life from

these dependent

appendages

with

impunity.
It is the strength of the tie that unites these office
appendages to the body of the Hospital proper which requires and
justifies

the implied covenant on the part? of Hospital to

-3-

refrain from using its other resources to injure the otherwise
defenseless interests of Plaintiff Development Company,

Were

Plaintiff's buildings free of the stranglehold of the tenancy
restrictions imposed by Hospital, in a setting and a location
better adapted to alternative uses, Defendants' arguments would
carry more weight.
of

Plaintiff's

However, because the constraints on the use

premises

are

themselves

integral

express

provisions of the contracts that inseparably tie Plaintiff's
health to the nourishment of the Hospital, it is only fair to
recognize

the implied

bounds these set on conduct of the

Hospital and those assisting it.
In short, the relationship fostered and created by the
Hospital is such that it requires no straining to read into that
relationship the fulfillment of the conditions for implying
lease restrictions as set forth in Stockton Dry Goods Co. v.
Girsh, 227 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1951), cited by Defendant Boyer at pp.
13-14 of its brief.

To repeat, those conditions were set forth

as follows:
(1)

The implication must arise from the language used or
it must be indispensable to effectuate the intention
of the parties;

(2)

It must appear from the language used that it was so
clearly within the contemplation of the.parties that
they deemed it unnecessary to express it;

(3)

Implied covenants can only
grounds of legal necessity;

(4)

A promise can be implied only where it can be
rightfully assumed that it would have been made if
attention had been called to it;

-4-

be

justified

on the

(5)

There can be no implied covenant wl^ere the subject is
completely covered by the contract.

227 P.2d at 3-4.
All of these requirements are met in the present case.
The implied

restriction on how the Hospital uses its other

property is necessary to effectuate the intent of the leases.
This implied restriction does appear to be sufficiently within
the

contemplation

of

the parties

necessary to expressly refer to it.

that

it was not deemed

There is adequate legal

necessity to imply such a restriction, since to act otherwise
results in a failure of consideration for the leases.

The

implied promise can rightfully be assumed to be one that would
nave been made had attention been called to it, especially since
the Hospital

required

in the beginning that Plaintiff stand

ready to construct a second building when requested by Hospital.
Finally, the scope of the written contracts between Development
Company and Hospital are not so complete and entire that they
preclude such an implied promise.
Moreover, Plaintiff
Complaint

should

to allege further

be entitled

facts regarding

to amend

its

the Defendant

Hospital's attempts to acquire Plaintiff's Professional building
in the recent past which may explain its actions in dealing with
Defendant

Boyer

to construct

another

building

that

will

obviously reduce the market value of Plaintiff's building.

This

is an important element of the entire schemfe Plaintiff would
like to flush out through further discovery.

In their developed

form, these facts will show this case is indeed similar to
-5-

Carter v. Adlery 291 P.2d 111 (Cal. App. 1955), as described at
pp. 15-16 of Boyer's brief•

The same result should apply, and

this Court should rule against the landlord Hospital.
B

-

Plaintiff's Claim does not Violate the Statute of
Frauds.

Defendants assert

that because

the contracts between

Plaintiff and Hospital pertain to leases with a duration of more
than one year, the language of Section 25-5-3 of the Utah Code
Annotated (1953) precludes the relief sought by Plaintiff.

All

that statute requires is that "the contract, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by
whom the lease or sale is to be made, . . . .ff ^Id.

This is no

bar because the leases between Plaintiff and Defendant Hospital
are clearly in writing, and subscribed by Defendant Hospital.
Cf. Peterson v. Hendricks, 524 P. 2d 321 (Utah 1974) where the
Court held there was sufficient memorandum of agreement to meet
the

requirements

of

the

statute

of

frauds,

although

correspondence of parties did not precisely describe the mining
claim and every term of agreement.
C.

The Parol Evidence Rule is no Bar to the Implied
Covenant.

In a case where the Utah Supreme Court has found a
contract

to be silent on a particular matter, after

first

looking to the four corners of the instrument, the Court found
it was proper to consider parol evidence, quoting with approval
the following statement from 30 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 1043:
The doctrine of partial integration is that where a
written contract is obviously not, or is shown not
-6-

to be, the complete contract, parol evidence not
inconsistent with the writing is admissible to show
what the entire contract really w a s , by
supplementing, as distinguished from contradicting,
the writing.
In such a case, parol evidence to
prove the part not reduced to writing is admissible,
although it is not admissible as to the part reduced
to writing,
Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Insurance Co., 669 P.2d 1201,
1205 (Utah 1983) .
In a slightly different setting, a settlement agreement
was reduced to writing and was found to be silpnt on plaintiff's
obligation

in return for the consideration promised by the

defendant.

Cobb v. Willis, 752 P.2d 106 (Haw. App. 1988).

Court

found

that the intended

return consideration

The

was a

dismissal of two pending suits, and at page 111, stated as
follows:
The law will impose an obligation on one party to an
agreement when, on the basis of all the provisions
of the contract as a whole, the obligation was
within the parties1 contemplation or is necessary to
effectuate the parties1 intentions. 17 Am. Jur. 2d
Contracts § 255 (1964); . . . [other citation
omitted].
Cf. Allstate Enterprises, Inc. v. Heriford, 772 P. 2d 466 (Utah
App. 1989) (Court supplied an implied-in-law term concerning
duration of indemnity agreement where the contract was silent).
In the present case, this Court should find that the
implied covenant sought to be enforced by Plaintiff is necessary
to accomplish

the intent of the parties to the leases, as

ascertained from a consideration of all of the provisions of the
leases, and is not barred by any rule of integration.

-7-

D.

The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
is an Important Factor to be Considered in Real
Estate Contracts,

Defendant Hospital has suggested that it is aware of no
Utah cases finding a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
the lease of real property.

(Hospital's brief at 15-16.)

This

statement overlooks a case cited by all parties. Leigh Furniture
and Carpet Company v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982).

At page

311 of that reported Opinion, the Utah Supreme Court noted that
Leigh Furniture "breached its implied duty to exercise all of
its rights under the contract reasonably and in good faith."
That was a case where this factor was important to the holding
that the landlord improperly attempted to terminate a lease of
real estate.

Later, in Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch,

706 P.2d 1028, 1037 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court again
found

that

an

implied

covenant

of good

faith

forbidding

arbitrary action by one party that disadvantages another to be
critical to its holding that a contract for the lease of real
estate was enforceable*
Accordingly, this Court should allow Plaintiff to pursue
its claim and present evidence on this point by vacating the
Order of the trial court and remanding this case for further
proceedings.
II.
PLAINTIFF'S THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC
RELATIONS STATES A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED.
Defendants1

claim

that the tort of interference with

-8-

prospective economic relations has not been $tated because the
Complaint supposedly lacks allegations pertaining to improper
purpose or improper means.

However, Defendants ignore the

teaching of Leigh Furniture that (1) a deliberate breach of
contract/ combined with

(2) an immediate purpose to inflict

injury, which purpose does not of itself predominate over a
legitimate economic end, may together suffice to satisfy the
improper means test.

657 P.2d at 309.

The rationale for this

holding is that "contract damages provide an insufficient remedy
for a breach prompted by an immediate purpose to injure, and
that purpose does not enjoy the same legal immunity in the
context of contract relations as it does in the competitive
marketplace."

Id.

In the present case, Plaintiff believes it has stated
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action and expects to
enlarge on the evidence supporting its claims, particularly in
the area of Defendant Hospital's motivation in attempting to
impair

the economic

building.

Since

viability

of Plaintiff's

the building

is situated

Professional
on

Defendant

Hospital's property it is totally dependant on the Hospital's
staff of doctors for its tenants.

Defendant Hospital also has

the first right of refusal to purchase the building, thereby
giving it a strong motive to engage in conduct^ which will cause
Plaintiff to sell the building at a substantially reduced price.
Defendants also argue that under the lower Court's ruling
Plaintiff could, if it chose, have repleaded its Third Cause of

-9-

Action.

To have done so would have resulted in a bifurcation of

the case.

Plaintiff is entitled to present all of its claims

arising from the same transaction or series of transactions in
the same case, particularly where the facts are interrelated and
mutually support the several counts of the Complaint.

It would

constitute manifest injustice to require Plaintiff to proceed on
its Third Cause of Action at the trial level while the issue of
the sufficiency of the facts to support the first two Causes of
Action is pending in this Court.

To do otherwise certainly

would create a duplication of time and effort and a waste of
judicial economy.

-10-

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's

Complaint

properly

allfeged

claims

for

injunctive relief and damages arising out of breach of contract
in the first two causes of action of the Complaint.
Plaintiff

has alleged

a cause of action

interference with economic relations.
should be given further

for

Similarly,
prospective

Alternatively, Plaintiff

leave to amend to reinforce and/or

further state any such cause of action.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Order dismissing
Plaintiff's Complaint should be reversed; and this case should
be remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's
decision, in keeping with the spirit of Rule 15(a) U.R.Civ.P.
relating to amendments to the pleadings.
DATED this ?»(?

day of March, 1990.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

AitfThur H. Nielsen
Q
John K. Mangum
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant
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